Chapter 2

The Peninsula Campaign

            General Johnston moved his troops out of winter quarters on March 8, 1862 in reaction to offensive moves by the new Federal commander, Major General George B. McClellan.  Through the weekend of March 8^th and 9^th, the Confederates slipped quietly out of their lines and headed south to Fredericksburg.  When the Federal commander later shifted his army by water to Fort Monroe, Johnston responded by moving his troops on April 5^th, to Yorktown (of Revolutionary War fame).  New recruits joined the 2^nd Mississippi’s ranks along the way. [30]

            The regiment spent a relatively quiet month manning the defensive lines at Yorktown.  During this time the regiment reorganized “for the war” and on April 23, 1862 installed newly elected officers.  Captain John Marshall Stone of Company K, the Iuka Rifles, beat out Colonel Falkner on the second ballot in a close election on April 21^st and replaced him in command. [31]   In the reorganizations that took place at higher echelons, General Whiting, despite reported problems with alcohol, was assigned to the command of a division that included his old brigade and the Texas Brigade under the command of Brigadier General John Bell Hood.  Colonel Evander M. Law of the 4^th Alabama assumed command of Whiting’s Brigade. [32]

            Johnston, establishing the same pattern of retreat that later became his “trademark,” became fearful that his position at Yorktown would be vulnerable to a turning movement by Union amphibious forces up the York River.  This could be expected as soon as McClellan had his heavy artillery in place to suppress the Confederate river batteries.  Johnston stayed in the Yorktown defenses only until he thought it prudent to pull out, which he did on May 3^rd.  He then retreated quickly up the Peninsula toward Richmond with Whiting’s Division acting as the rear guard. [33]

            The 2^nd Mississippi would see its first major action under Colonel Stone at the Battle of Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks) on May 31, 1862.  McClellan’s Army of the Potomac had forced Johnston to retreat all the way to the outskirts of Richmond and sat astride the Chickahominy River.  Heavy rains caused the river to flood, cutting communications between two Federal corps south of the river and the rest of the Federal army to the north.  Johnston hoped to throw his weight against the two isolated Union corps and destroy them.  On May 31^st, the Confederates advanced along two converging roads toward the enemy positions south of the Chickahominy.  Nine Mile Road, the more northerly route, was the one Whiting’s Division was to take.  Whiting would be behind and in support of Major General James Longstreet’s Division. [34]

            Law’s Brigade advanced on the road toward Seven Pines with the Texas Brigade in the woods to the right.  Although the division was originally intended to back up Longstreet’s offensive along Nine Mile Road, Johnston ordered it forward to secure Longstreet’s exposed left flank instead.  Law, in the lead, was unexpectedly hit by fire from a long-range enemy battery.  Whiting halted the column and deployed Law’s Brigade to meet the artillery threat, but Johnston, insisting the Federals could not be in force this far from Seven Pines, rebuked him for his excessive caution and ordered Law to send a single regiment across the field.  The 4^th Alabama went forward but was soon put to retreat when a solid line of Federal infantry rose up and fired into their ranks. [35]

            At about 2:30 that afternoon, Union Major General Edwin Sumner had pushed Brigadier General John Sedgwick’s division and a battery of his II Corps across the flooded Chickahominy on rickety, makeshift bridges that most other generals would not have dared to use.  These troops had met retreating elements of other Federal commands and formed a defensive position northeast of Fair Oaks.  Refusing to believe that the Federals could have crossed the swollen Chickahominy in force and anxious to link up with Longstreet, Johnston continued to order piecemeal attacks. [36]

            Whiting threw three more brigades into the expanding fight at Fair Oaks, one after another, against a Federal position that was growing steadily stronger as more of Sedgwick’s men came up from the river crossing.  By nightfall, the Federals had about 10,700 men in action, a substantial edge over the 8,700 Whiting brought to the fight. [37]   During the fighting late in the day, General Johnston was seriously wounded and the senior major general, Gustavus Woodson Smith, suddenly found himself in command of the Confederate army.  The battle dragged on the following day, June 1^st, and Smith, uncertain of Johnston’s plans and having none of his own, did not inspire confidence when queried by President Jefferson Davis.  Davis would allow Smith hold the army’s reins long enough to see the present battle through, but no longer.  The army, Davis decided, must have a new commander.  The battle ended about 11:30 a.m. that day with little accomplished by either side except a lengthening casualty list.  The 2^nd Mississippi suffered a total of 37 casualties – 6 killed, 28 wounded (7 mortally), and 4 captured (including one of the wounded). [38]

            Shortly after the Battle of Seven Pines, Davis appointed General Robert E. Lee to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Stonewall Jackson’s recent smashing victories in the Shenandoah Valley against combined Federal forces three times as large as his own helped shape Lee’s evolving plan to defeat McClellan.  Wishing to maintain his options both in the Valley and in front of Richmond, Lee decided he would reinforce Jackson with Chase Whiting’s two brigades.  The trip took almost a week.  Private Sam Hankins of Company E related a stressful incident during a portion of the trip made by rail:

At Farmville, Va., we came to the noted long and tall bridge.  This bridge had been reported unsafe, and the travelling public between Richmond and Lynchburg would go through Danville, Va., many miles out of the way, to avoid it.  We had to risk it, though; and knowing about its being condemned, I had been dreading the danger for some time.  I was on top of the car (my usual place) when we arrived at the bridge, and when near its center the train came to a standstill.  I looked over the edge of the car far down into the valley, where cattle grazing looked as small as sheep.  The engines began to puff and blow and slip, then a slack was followed by a quick jerk, when it seemed that the frail structure was giving way and sinking beneath me.  This slacking and jerking lasted one hour, though it appeared to last longer than the war (four years).  Conjectures were rife as to the cause of the delay.  It was my greatest fright during the war.  However, we passed over in safety. [39]

            On June 16^th, Whiting linked up with Jackson’s “Army of the Valley” at Staunton. [40]

            That same day, Lee sent orders to Jackson to join his forces near Richmond.  Thus, instead of starting out on another of Jackson’s legendary Valley campaigns, the new arrivals were shocked to learn they were to start back in the direction they had just come.  The 2^nd Mississippi, first by rail, then on the march, headed toward Richmond now as part of Major General Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Army.  Although their destination was the subject of intense speculation, it soon became apparent to the men that Richmond was their goal.  The trip to the Shenandoah Valley had only been part of an elaborate ruse. [41]

            By June 25^th, Jackson gave priority to closing up his strung-out column of march.  As a consequence, units of his army in the advance did little more than mark time that day.  Sergeant A. L. P. Vairin of the 2^nd Mississippi, in the vanguard, recorded, “June 25 Wednesday.  Clear.  6 a.m. marched 3 miles & rested til 12 a.m. then marched 1 mi. to Ashland and filed off toward Richmond 1 ½ mi. & rested....  Camped for the night, drew 2 days rations of crackers...” [42]

            By June 26^th, Jackson’s troops were near the fighting at Mechanicsville between Major General A. P. Hill’s Division and the isolated Federal V Corps commanded by Major General Fitz John Porter.  Hill launched a strong attack, but was repulsed with heavy losses.  Porter, believing his position to be untenable, retreated to the east. [43]

            The Confederates followed Porter the following morning with Jackson’s command on the left wing.  Jackson moved with uncharacteristic slowness causing the Confederate battle plans to go awry.  A. P. Hill again fell upon the Federals without adequate support.  The Union troops were heavily entrenched on high ground behind Boatswain’s Swamp.  The battle fought here would carry the name of a nearby landmark called Gaines’ Mill. [44]

            Piecemeal attacks against Porter’s center and left had only resulted in heavy Confederate casualties and units being repulsed or pinned down.  The rear of the Confederate lines became so chaotic and confused that entire units trying to move forward against the Federals became separated and lost in a sea of human flotsam – wounded and stragglers.  Whiting’s Division was the last to arrive on the battlefield.  It made its way to a position behind A. P. Hill, just to the right of the Confederate center.  As the sun was beginning to fade from view, Lee ordered Whiting forward against the entrenched Federals. [45]

            When Colonel Law received the order to advance, he moved out with his brigade in two lines.  In the front line was the 11^th Mississippi on the left and 4^th Alabama on the right.  In the rear line was the 2^nd Mississippi and 6^th North Carolina, respectively.  The Texas Brigade formed on Law’s left, also in two lines.  Hood’s first line contained, from left to right, Hampton’s Legion, the 5^th Texas, and 1^st Texas, with the 18^th Georgia and 4^th Texas in the second line. [46]

            After the advance began, General Hood saw that a gap was developing between Law’s right and the left of Brigadier General George E. Pickett’s brigade of Virginians who were moving forward with Law.  Hood took personal command of the 4^th Texas and maneuvered it across Law’s rear to fill the gap.  Apparently some of the men of the 18^th Georgia also followed the Texans. [47]

            The Federal position chosen as the focus for the attack was a formidable one.  Boatswain’s Swamp (actually more of a sluggish stream) flowed at the bottom of a wooded ravine.  Behind this stream, the Federals had entrenched in two strong lines, one on the bank of the stream, and the second at the top of the ravine where the woods opened into a field.  The stream, with 10-foot banks in places, effectively served as a defensive moat.  Earlier the Federals had cleared trees to give them better fields of fire and to construct breastworks, fronted by an abatis of sharpened limbs.  To the rear of the second Federal line, the terrain rose to a plateau that was occupied by artillery batteries and additional reserve troops.  The Federal troops facing Whiting’s men belonged to Brigadier General John H. Martindales’s Brigade of Brigadier General George W. Morell’s Division, V Corps, Army of the Potomac. [48]

            As the 2^nd Mississippi advanced with the rest of the brigade, they initially came under artillery fire from the Federal batteries unlimbered on the plateau, but soon were also subjected to heavy musketry.  As Whiting reported after the battle:

...and the whole line, consisting of the Fourth and Fifth Texas, Eighteenth Georgia, Eleventh Mississippi, Fourth Alabama, and Sixth North Carolina, the Second Mississippi being held in partial reserve, but advancing with the line, charged the ravine with a yell, General Hood and Colonel Law gallantly heading [leading] their men. [49]  

            According to a private in Company E, 2^nd Mississippi, the regiment was more involved in the fighting than its “reserve” status would indicate:

We moved some three or four hundred yards, halted, and came to a front, when Gen. W.C. Whiting, commanding our brigade, gave the order, “Come on!” (not go on).  He was seated on his spirited dapple gray.  We gave the Rebel yell and across that field we rushed, while men were falling thick and fast.  Our orderly sergeant was killed and our second lieutenant wounded.  Our third lieutenant being on detached duty, our second sergeant took command of the company. [50]

            The charge by Hood’s and Law’s brigades broke the Federal lines and put the defenders to flight, leaving the Confederates in possession of several pieces of artillery, discarded equipment and accouterments and almost two entire Yankee regiments as prisoners of war. [51]

            The 2^nd Mississippi officially reported casualties of 21 killed and 79 wounded.  It is not known with certainty how many men it took into action.  Company E reportedly carried 76 men into the engagement.  With its heavy spring recruiting, and accounting for losses at Seven Pines, the regiment may have numbered between 750-800 men during the fight at Gaines’ Mill. [52]   “The Second Mississippi, Col. J. M. Stone,” added Whiting in concluding his report of the battle, “was skillfully handled by its commander and sustained severe loss.” [53]

            Following Gaines’ Mill, the Federal commander deceived Lee as to his intended line of retreat.  Instead of falling back on his original York River base, McClellan implemented a complex and risky change of base across Lee’s front, south to the James River.  Lee however, was never able to firmly come to grips with McClellan’s rear guard and bring the Army of the Potomac to bay on terms favorable to the Confederates.  On July 1^st, the final battle of the Seven Days, Malvern Hill, was fought.  Here the 2^nd Mississippi was not actively engaged, but was forced to endure sharpshooter and artillery fire to which they could not effectively reply. The regiment reported losses of 1 killed and 10 wounded, almost all caused by the massed Federal artillery. [54]

            At the conclusion of the Seven Days, Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia into two “wings” (this was prior to official approval for an army corps organization).  These wings were placed under the command of Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet.  Although Whiting’s Division had been part of Jackson’s command, it was detached on July 13, 1862, and later assigned to Longstreet’s wing.  The division was placed under the command of the senior brigadier, John B. Hood, when Whiting took an extended sick leave from the army.  After Whiting was transferred, Hood was given permanent command of the division.  The brigade containing the 2^nd Mississippi remained under the temporary command of Colonel Law.  He was officially promoted to the rank of brigadier general on October 2, 1862. [55]