Chapter 3

Second Manassas, South Mountain and Antietam

            Following Malvern Hill, Hood’s Division recuperated in the vicinity of Richmond for several weeks.  Concluding that Richmond was no longer in danger from McClellan’s forces still on the Peninsula, Lee decided that Major General John Pope, commander of the newly formed Federal Army of Virginia, [56] needed to be “suppressed.”  On August 13, 1862, Hood was ordered north to take part in Lee’s new offensive.  Lee hoped to strike Pope before the balance of McClellan’s troops could be brought back from the Peninsula as reinforcements.  Lee sent Jackson around Pope’s right flank and followed with Longstreet’s command as the Federal commander “took the bait” and moved north in pursuit of Jackson. [57]

            After destroying the Federal supply depot at Manassas on August 26^th, Jackson established a defensive position along an unfinished railroad cut near the old Manassas battlefield.  Pope, after finally locating Jackson, began launching attacks against the position on the evening of August 28^th.  At about 10:00 a.m. the following day, Lee and Longstreet joined Jackson, while Pope remained oblivious to their presence.  Jackson’s men were exhausted and running critically low on ammunition.  Longstreet advanced his wing northeasterly along the Warrenton Turnpike, Hood’s Division in the vanguard.  Longstreet spent much of the day methodically deploying a massive assault column to smash into Pope’s left flank.  Hood positioned his old Texas Brigade to the right of the turnpike and Law to the left.  Law’s Brigade thus became the leftmost infantry command in Longstreet’s line, almost, but not quite, linking with Jackson’s right, the gap being covered by Confederate artillery. [58]

            About 6:00 p.m. Hood’s men were preparing to conduct a reconnaissance to their front, when two Federal brigades with attached artillery and cavalry, obviously unaware of a Confederate presence, came down the turnpike.  Pope, who was convinced that Jackson was in retreat and ignorant of Longsteet’s arrival, had prematurely ordered a pursuit of the supposed retreating Confederates.  Hood’s men ambushed the Federal column and pushed them back up the turnpike more than half a mile.  At one point a Federal counterattack threatened to throw the Confederates back.  Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s Federal brigade was threatening to turn Law’s right flank.  Law countered this move by aligning the 2^nd Mississippi along the road, at right angles to the rest of his line.  The Mississippians raked Doubleday’s men with an enfilading fire and forced them to retreat to the top of the ridge.  As the Confederates continued to advance and engaged the Federals in the failing light atop the ridge, the fighting degenerated into a confused, bloody brawl.  Finally however, the Confederates swept the remaining Union infantry and artillery off the ridge.  By this time, only dead and wounded Federals remained.  Doubleday’s and Colonel Timothy Sullivan’s (formerly Brigadier General John P. Hatch’s) Federal brigades had become a disorganized mob, heading rearward.  Officers rode among the men, trying to rally them in hope that they might at least cover a retreat long enough so that some of the wounded could be brought off.  After unsuccessfully berating several groups of retreating Federal troops, Major Charles Livingston of the 76^th New York finally came across a regiment marching, as the Seventy-sixth’s historian put it, “in tolerable order.”  Livingston ordered them to halt and turn about, “giving emphasis to the command by earnest gesticulations with his sword, and insisting that it was a shame to see a whole regiment running away.”  An officer of the regiment in question, apparently annoyed that a stranger would presume to usurp his command, challenged Livingston:  “Who are you sir?”

            The reply came back, “Major Livingston of the Seventy-sixth New York.”

            “Seventy-sixth what?” asked the officer.

            “Seventy-sixth New York.”

            “Well, then,” replied the officer, probably with more than a little bemused satisfaction, “you are my prisoner, for you are attempting to rally the Second Mississippi.” [59]

            As darkness fell and it was only with difficulty that friend could be distinguished from foe, Hood disengaged and fell back to his original position.  By midnight, the 2^nd Mississippi was back in line just north of the Warrenton Turnpike near the Brawner Farm. [60]

            With the morning of August 30^th, Lee awaited Pope’s renewed attacks.  However Pope spent the morning arguing with his subordinates that the Confederates were in retreat and not, as was actually the case, massing for a counterstroke.  Finally at 3:00 p.m. Porter’s V Corps launched a final attack on Jackson’s position, allowing Longstreet’s artillery to pour a deadly enfilade fire into the left flank of the assault column.  The Federal attack swept from southeast to northwest diagonally across the front of Hood’s Division.  During this final Federal attack, the men of Hood’s division were essentially just spectators.  Finally, Longstreet, seeing that Porter’s attack had been repulsed and that Pope had committed his reserves, sent his own massive assault column of 25,000 gray infantry forward, Hood’s Division in the lead, in a smashing counterattack. [61]

            With Hood’s Division designated the “column of direction” for Longstreet’s assault, Law, in theory, was to have advanced on the Texas Brigade’s left flank, just north of the turnpike.  Theory had long since fallen victim to dust, death and confusion, however.  Law lost contact with the Texans almost immediately.  His advance instead amounted to a series of moves from one rise to the next in support of some of Hood’s batteries.  By about 5:30 p.m. Law had worked his brigade into position in some timber along Young’s Branch at the base of Dogan Ridge.  On the ridge above them, Law’s men could see what was left of Major General Franz Sigel’s Union corps, along with a number of batteries, including Captain Hubert Dilger’s, which had proven to be a particular annoyance to the Southerners during their advance.  Law decided to attack.  Although successful in putting the 45^th New York Infantry Regiment to flight, Law’s pursuit was checked by the 2^nd and 7^th Wisconsin Infantry Regiments – Iron Brigade units – backed by artillery.  Thinking this was a situation his brigade should not tackle alone, Colonel Law decided to break off the engagement and return to the base of the ridge. [62]   The 2^nd Mississippi reported losses of 22 killed and 87 wounded for the two days of fighting.  Its strength at Second Manassas was not reported, but the regiment may have carried as many as 450-500 men into action. [63]

            The beaten Federal Army of Virginia limped back to Washington where it was absorbed into the Army of the Potomac, once more under McClellan’s helm.  Lee now decided to take the fight north into Maryland.  Potential foreign recognition, fresh recruits from pro-Southern Marylanders, and improved subsistence for the army from Maryland’s unravaged countryside all played a part in the decision to launch his raid.  The Army of Northern Virginia left the vicinity of Manassas on September 2^nd, crossed the Potomac north of Leesburg, and on September 7^th occupied Frederick, Maryland.  Lee decided to split his forces in order to capture the large Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry.  The bulk of Longstreet’s troops, including the 2^nd Mississippi, marched west to Hagerstown while Jackson’s men with assorted other army detachments took various roads south.  Shortly after their arrival at Hagerstown, word came that McClellan had left Washington and was uncharacteristically pressing aggressively upon Lee’s rear guard and screening forces. [64]

            The usually cautious McClellan’s newfound sense of aggressiveness was fostered by the discovery on September 13^th of a copy of Lee’s campaign plans outlining the division of the Confederate army and routes of march.  On September 14^th, the Army of the Potomac engaged the Southern forces detached to guard the two passes through South Mountain, Maryland.  Responding to the seriousness of the threat, Longstreet ordered Hood back from Hagerstown via Boonsboro to reinforce the Confederate defenders at Turner’s Gap.  Immediately upon arriving, Hood deployed Law’s Brigade and his Texans, and in a counterattack, drove the Federals back at bayonet point.  The 2^nd Mississippi suffered approximately 17-18 casualties, mostly wounded and captured. [65]

            At nightfall, Lee fell back from the gaps with Hood’s Division acting as rear guard.  Although a more prudent commander would have probably fallen back across the Potomac into Virginia, Lee chose to stand and fight.  He concentrated his forces in a strong defensive position on the west side of Antietam Creek around the village of Sharpsburg, Maryland.  He wanted to maintain this position to block any attempted advance by McClellan and allow time to complete the capture of Harpers Ferry and its garrison. [66]

            Tired and hungry, the men of the 2^nd Mississippi found it necessary to again advance against the Federals at dusk on the evening of September 16^th.  Elements of the Army of the Potomac had crossed Antietam Creek north of Lee’s army and were moving into positions opposite the Confederate left flank.  Hood was ordered into the East Woods, a small woodlot which was being infiltrated by Federal skirmishers.  Law’s Brigade, in skirmish order just north of the East Woods, was suddenly met by a reconnaissance party of the 13^th Pennsylvania Reserves (“Bucktails”).  The Bucktails, with their Sharps breechloading rifles, used their enhanced firepower to turn the slow withdrawal of Law’s skirmishers into a stampede as they neared the edge of the woods.  Luckily, the 4^th and 5^th Texas arrived to hit the Pennsylvanians simultaneously from the west and south, supported by a section of howitzers from Stephen D. Lee’s artillery battalion.  By 8:00 p.m. however, most of Hood’s units had fallen back to the West Woods for the night.  As darkness fell, Law’s Brigade soon came under Federal artillery fire from the batteries to their right on the other side of Antietam Creek. [67]

            As night approached, the men lay in the West Woods, facing north while the Union heavy guns fired down the length of their lines from the east.  Luckily, most of the shots fell just in front or rear of the Confederate positions.  However, the colonel of the 11^th Mississippi, Phillip Liddell, was struck in the torso by a bursting shell fragment and would die two days later. [68]

            Some time after midnight, Hood’s men were relieved and allowed to get some rest and food.  Other than a half ration of beef and some green corn, they had not eaten for three days.  As most of the men wearily returned to their original positions near the Dunker Church, details from each company were sent to forage for food and prepare a morning meal. [69]

            The men of the 2^nd Mississippi were awakened on the morning of September 17^th while it was still dark.  Although Hood had persuaded General Lee to allow the division to stay in reserve long enough for the men to eat their long-overdue meal, McClellan’s battle plans did not cooperate.  Shells began to fall near the Dunker Church in preparation for a Federal assault on the Confederate left.  Law was forced to order the still-hungry men to fall into ranks and prepare for battle. [70]

            Somewhat after 6:00 a.m., Colonel Law moved his brigade in columns east across the Hagerstown Pike, where it turned north and deployed in a single battle line.  The 2^nd Mississippi under Colonel Stone anchored the extreme left of Law’s line, while next came the 11^th Mississippi, 6^th North Carolina and 4^th Alabama on the extreme right.  To the left of the 2^nd Mississippi the Texas Brigade was similarly deployed in line, with the 1^st Texas on the right of the brigade.  Law’s men advanced into the Miller Cornfield in a generally northerly direction, loading and firing as they went, except for the 4^th Alabama, which moved by the right flank down the Smoketown Road toward the East Woods.  The veteran fighters of the 2^nd and 11^th Mississippi and the 6^th North Carolina savagely drove the Federals out of the Cornfield (probably upset at having their long-anticipated breakfasts interrupted).  They then reformed along a rail fence at the northern edge of the field, continuing to fire at Federal batteries and infantry units coming onto the scene.  At one point, the Confederate line rose and fired at a mere thirty feet distance into the 4^th and 8^th Pennsylvania Reserves, panicking them, which in turn, panicked the 3^rd Pennsylvania Reserves in their rear.  As the Federals regrouped and additional reinforcements arrived, however, Hood’s men saw they could not continue to hold their position without help.  Union soldiers were infiltrating the gap that had developed between the 6^th North Carolina’s right flank and the 4^th Alabama’s left, slowed by its advance into the East Woods.  The men had to fall back.  As Law’s men withdrew, the northern border of the Cornfield along the fence was marked by a long precise, row of Mississippians, stuck down where they stood by one terrible fire. [71]

            Hood’s punishing counterattack into the Miller Cornfield had saved the Confederate left, but at a terrible cost.  As the survivors retired behind the Dunker Church, they found only about 700 unwounded men of approximately 2000 in the division who had advanced at dawn.  For expediency, the remnants of Hood’s two brigades were reorganized in the field as two regiments.  Despite the losses however, these veteran soldiers recovered sufficiently to be used to gather up stragglers from other units.  By 1:00 p.m., Hood had been resupplied with ammunition and the men were ready for combat once again, but the main fighting had moved further down the line.  The Federals showed no further interest in trying to advance against the Confederate left for the remainder of the day. [72]

            After the war, on June 1, 1876, Colonel Rufus Dawes of the 6^th Wisconsin wrote Colonel (then Governor) Stone a letter that mentioned the fight at Antietam.  It reads in part, “We fought the Second Mississippi in the corn field in front of the Dunkark [sic] Church at Antietam.  They drove us, and we barely saved by hand a battery of six twelve-pound howitzers, planted in front of some hay stacks.  You will remember this place well, if your [sic] are Col. Stone of that Regiment.”  This would not be the last time the 2^nd Mississippi encountered the 6^th Wisconsin in battle.  The regiment reported heavy losses of 27 killed and 127 wounded at Antietam.  Its strength is not known with certainty, but may have numbered about 300 effectives at the start of the battle (most Southern regiments were much reduced by straggling on the march north into Maryland).  Among the wounded were Colonel Stone, Lieutenant Colonel David Humphreys and Major John Blair, all the regiment’s field officers. [73]